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An Invitation to a Four-Network Theory of Power: 
A New Viewpoint Compatible with Elite Theory 
G. William Domhoff  
Abstract: »Einladung zu einer Netzwerktheorie von Macht: Ein neuer Ansatz 
zur Verbindung von Machttheorie und Elitetheorie«. Starting with the multi-
network theories advocated by C. Wright Mills, Michael Mann and Richard 
Lachmann, and drawing on work by specialists in anthropology and social psy-
chology, this article presents a history of social power from hunting and gath-
ering societies to the present. Collective power, based on cooperation, came 
first in human history, with distributive power coming much later. With the 
rise of permanent hierarchical organizations at the dawn of civilization, the is-
sue of distributive power became paramount, making it necessary to resolve 
distributive power conflicts among leaders before collective power could ex-
pand any further. At this point the rank-and-file lost their ability to replace or-
ganizational leaders, who then became “political elites” or “power elites.” The 
result was the kind of top-down societies analyzed by John Higley and Michael 
Burton in Elite Foundations of Liberal Democracy, which provides a provoca-
tive new challenge to traditional theories of democracy. 
Keywords: power, power network, elite theory. 
Introduction 
In this essay I want to honour John Higley for his many contributions to politi-
cal sociology over four decades, and for Elite Foundations of Liberal Democ-
racy (2006) in particular, which is a fitting capstone to a magnificent career.     
I also want to thank him for his willingness to engage with researchers from the 
parallel, but slightly different, power structure research tradition (Domhoff 
2007; Domhoff 2010). I do so by presenting my take on the history of social 
power, which starts with the multi-network theories of power used by C. 
Wright Mills (1956; 1962), Michael Mann (1986b), and Richard Lachmann 
(2010), but which also has some overlap with the modern-day version of elite 
theory that Higley and Michael Burton have elaborated and applied to great 
effect over the past twenty-five years (Burton and Higley 1987; Higley and 
Burton 2006). 
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Drawing on work by specialists in anthropology, social psychology, and his-
tory, the analysis I present is a general one that concerns power in human so-
cieties from small hunting and gathering groups to the development of large 
nation-states in Western history. Starting with the paradoxical fact that human 
beings lived in relatively egalitarian societies for most of their history, my aim 
is to uncover the origins and development of the four main networks of power 
underlying the organizations that provide the top modern-day leaders called 
“political elites” in elite theory (Higley and Burton 2006, 7). There is not 
enough space for a full presentation of my argument and evidence, but there is 
enough for readers to decide if it might provide a useful underpinning for elite 
theorists to think about how human beings ended up in very hierarchical socie-
ties.  
Following Bertrand Russell (1938) and Dennis Wrong (1995), I define 
power as the ability to achieve desired social outcomes. This highly abstract 
definition is useful because of the range of power configurations it allows for 
and also because it does not assume that power is always at bottom coercive, as 
many definitions do. Furthermore, I agree with the many theorists who say that 
power has two intertwined dimensions. First, there is “collective power,” the 
overall capacity of a group, class, or nation to be effective and productive, 
which concerns the combination of technological resources, organizational 
forms, and social morale necessary to achieve shared goals. Second, and also a 
familiar point, the concept of power includes the ability of a group, class, or 
nation to be successful in conflicts with other groups, classes, or nations on 
issues of concern to it. Here the stress is on “power over,” or “distributive 
power.” In my view, collective and distributive power are not only intertwined, 
but there is good reason to believe collective power, based on cooperation, 
came first, and that distributive power in any large and hierarchical sense came 
much later. Going one step further, my claim is that at a certain stage in the 
development of social power the issue of distributive power becomes para-
mount, making it necessary to resolve distributive conflicts among rival leaders 
before collective power can be expanded. So it is only with the development of 
large-scale organizations – and most elite theorists probably concur – that 
collective and distributive power became fully enmeshed in what might be 
described as a deadly embrace.  
Organizations are basically sets of rules and roles that human beings de-
velop so they can accomplish a particular purpose; they provide ways in which 
people do something together in a routine fashion. For example, religious or-
ganizations develop shared routines (“ceremonies”) to cope with the varying 
mixtures of anxiety, anger, and guilt that inevitably accompany momentous 
events, such as birth, puberty, marriage, and death. Routines become “rituals” 
in the realm of religion because they have to be done in exactly the right ways 
to bind and dissipate the emotions they attempt to control. These rituals, along 
with the beliefs that explain and justify them, become the basis for the organi-
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zations called sacred huts, primitive secret societies, churches, mosques, and 
synagogues. Or, to take another quick example, the established routines for 
face-to-face economic exchanges become one basis for the more complex 
economic system of markets, which then lead to agreed-upon mediums of 
exchange, such as money, as well as the agreements and contracts that make a 
chunk of land or a factory into “private property.” 
Since human beings have a vast array of purposes, they have formed an ap-
propriately large number of organizations. But only four of these purposes and 
organizations weigh heavily in terms of generating societal power: economic 
organizations, political organizations, military organizations, and religious 
organizations. All of them enhance the collective power of their members, but 
at the same time they can quickly become very hierarchical when they begin to 
grow larger or face an outside threat.  
Religious organizations, to which I have already alluded, are concerned with 
meaning, ethical norms, and ritual practices, but such an abstract statement 
sounds too benign in that it belies the depth of human terror and irrationality 
that lie within religion’s purview. The most prominent historical example in 
Western history is the Catholic Church, the most powerful organization in 
Europe during the 1000-year period in which that continent was known as 
“Christendom.” In all cases, however, religious organizations gain loyalty and 
financial support (“sacrifices,” “tithing”) by providing answers to such univer-
sal and existential concerns as the reasons for guilt, the origins of humanity, the 
meaning of death, and the purpose of life.  
The economic network consists of a set of organizations concerned with sat-
isfying material needs through the “extraction, transformation, distribution and 
consumption of the objects of nature” (Mann 1986b, 24). The economic net-
work gives rise to “classes,” which can be defined as positions in a social struc-
ture that are shaped by their relationship to, and power over, the different parts 
of the economic process. The most powerful economic class, the owners of the 
key economic organizations, usually is called a “ruling” or “dominant” class if 
– and only if – it has been successful in subordinating the leaders in the other 
three networks. As in elite theory, it is not inevitable that owners will become a 
ruling class. Geographically extensive classes, because they are dependent 
upon advances in infrastructure, arose very slowly in Western history. For the 
first 2500 years of Western civilization, for example, economic networks were 
extremely localized, especially in comparison to the political and military net-
works discussed shortly. 
Economic classes are also social relationships between groups of people 
who often have different interests in terms of how the economic system is 
organized and how its output is distributed. The economic network may there-
fore generate class conflicts, which are disagreements over such matters as 
wage rates, working conditions, unionization, profit margins, and even the fact 
of private ownership itself. Class conflicts can manifest themselves in ways 
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that range from workplace protests and strikes to industry-wide boycotts and 
collective bargaining and on up to nationwide political actions.  
However, class conflict is not inevitable in this theory because both owners 
and workers, the usual rival classes in recent history, have to have the means to 
organize themselves over an extended area of social space for conflict to occur. 
Otherwise, there is simply exploitation and coercion by the dominant class, 
with occasional rebel uprisings or sporadic violence. For much of Western 
history, there have been well-organized dominant classes, but class conflict has 
been important only in certain periods of it, such as in ancient Greece, early 
Rome, and the present capitalist era. This is because non-owning economic 
classes usually find it very difficult to organize into a coherent force. 
The third major organized power network, the political network, regulates 
activities within the geographical area for which it is responsible, including the 
movement of people, economic goods, and weapons in and out of its territory. 
This network, which is usually called the “government” or the “state,” is sepa-
rate from the other networks because people in general, and the economic 
network in particular, desperately depend on the regulatory and judicial ser-
vices it provides. Groups of people may be in general cooperative, or so I 
claim, but there are always disagreements that flair up between individuals or 
families, and there are inevitably a few people who dispute every issue or ig-
nore laws and customs, thereby creating problems for everyone.  
In the case of the highly complex economic networks of the capitalist era, 
competing businesses find it especially difficult to regulate themselves because 
some of them try to improve their market share or profits by reducing wages, 
adulterating products, colluding with other companies, or telling half-truths. 
Thus, it is very difficult if not impossible for an economic network to survive 
without some degree of market regulation by the political network. Political 
networks also enforce property and contract rights, and in more recent times 
they have been given the added duties of creating money and shaping interest 
rates. Although the United States tried to function without a central bank for 
much of the 19th century, the problems were so great that after the Panic of 
1907 the most powerful bankers of the day realized they had to work together 
to create the Federal Reserve System in 1913 (Livingston 1986). 
The necessary services provided by the political network make it potentially 
independent from the other networks, including the economic network, and it 
gains further potential autonomy due to the fact that it interacts with other 
states, especially through warfare. Leaders in the economic network therefore 
greatly fear government independence, and constantly rail against it, even 
though, and maybe precisely because, they need its help in structuring the 
economy, as seen most dramatically in the United States since at least the 
1850s with the gradual rise of large corporations. The bailout of the financiers 
in 2008 reveals both the need and the fear. 
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Finally, and obviously, the military network is rooted in organized physical 
violence. It is based on the ability to generate direct and immediate coercion 
that leads to death, surrender, or enslavement. Surprisingly to the modern eye, 
military networks had a greater range throughout most of Western history than 
either economic or political networks. Historically, many armies fought for the 
benefit of their own leaders, who created “empires of domination” by taking 
over newly arisen civilizations that were based on the religious, economic, and 
political networks. In more recent centuries, the military is usually part of the 
government, but the frequent emergence of guerrilla armies and terrorist or-
ganizations shows that organized violence can still arise separately from gov-
ernment.  
Although military power is usually theorized as one aspect of government, 
there are at least three reasons for distinguishing political and military power. 
First, most historical states have not controlled all the military forces within the 
territory they claim to regulate. Second, there are historical instances of con-
quest undertaken by armies that were not controlled by governments. Third, 
even in modern-day nation-states, the military is often set apart from other 
government institutions, which facilitates the in-group morale, sense of sepa-
rateness, and independent hierarchical structure that makes it possible for ambi-
tious military leaders to overthrow governmental leaders, especially in times 
when these leaders appear to be weak in the face of economic problems or 
threats from other countries. 
In the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, rival social theorists argued that 
one or two of the four basic power networks were more “basic” or “primary” 
than the others, leading to longstanding disagreements. For example, many 
theorists claimed that the economic network was the most basic because people 
cannot live without food and shelter, but contrary to that claim, it also can be 
argued that human beings would not have survived for very long if they had not 
developed the religious beliefs and practices that allow them to deal with the 
anxieties and fears that can paralyze day-to-day work efforts. The hunters in 
pre-agricultural societies believed they had to be on good terms with the spirit 
world to be successful, and early agriculturalists believed their fields had to be 
blessed to be fertile, which gave an important role to shamans from the outset. 
In other words, it may be that shamans and religious leaders carry out the ritu-
als that make it possible for other people to go about their daily business, which 
implies that religious networks are necessary for economic networks to func-
tion smoothly. 
After the decades of endless disputation and counterarguments that never 
seem to be resolved, with many sociology graduate programs still starting with 
the inculcation of the Holy Trinity of Marx, Weber, and Durkheim, with an 
occasional nod to Spencer and militarism, it seems more likely to me (on the 
basis of the full sweep of the anthropological and historical record that has 
been compiled by numerous brilliant specialists over the past one hundred 
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years) that no one network came first or is somehow more basic than the oth-
ers. Each network always has presupposed the existence of the others from the 
beginning of human history.  
Furthermore, one kind of organizational power can be turned into any one of 
the others. Economic power can be turned into political power, as seen in the 
United States and many other Western nations. Religious power can generate 
military power, as suggested in the case of the Iranian revolution in 1979. Mili-
tary power can conquer political power. Thus, power is similar to the concept 
of “energy” in the natural sciences: it cannot be reduced to one primary form 
(Russell 1938). This complexity is one of the main reasons why it is necessary 
to do detailed historical and sociological studies to understand the power struc-
ture in any social group. Generalizations from society to society or historical 
epoch to historical epoch are risky if not impossible. 
But how did these power networks arise? 
The Early Origins of Social Power 
The early outlines of the four main networks of power and their interdepend-
ence can already be seen in small hunting and gathering societies when hunting 
parties are organized (economic organization, with meat shared equally among 
all members of the society), when communal gatherings are called in an at-
tempt to defuse interpersonal disputes that threaten to rip apart the whole group 
(political organization, which involves the regulation of human interactions 
within a specific territory), when the men band together to do battle with rival 
groups or clans (military organization), and when rituals to deal with anxiety, 
guilt, and the fear of death are performed (religious organization). 
More speculatively, and with all the attendant risks of going back six million 
years in evolutionary history, I think we see glimmers of three of these four 
networks in chimpanzee social groups. As demonstrated and synthesized in the 
work of several primatologists (e.g., De Waal 1982/1998; Goodall 1986; 
Wrangham and Peterson 1996), two or three chimpanzee males sometimes 
cooperate in catching small animals (the hunt) and small bands of male chimps 
patrol the borders of their group’s territory, killing any males that happen to 
stray into it; these actions have all the earmarks of militarism. Then, too, chimp 
bands usually have a powerful male who takes on the “control role,” that is, he 
is responsible for breaking up fights that have the potential to escalate into 
larger mayhem. This role fits with the idea of the political network having the 
function of “regulating behaviour” with a given territory. It is also interesting 
that the most powerful chimps are not invariably doing the regulating and that 
members of the group, including females, help determine which high-ranking 
male assumes the control role. 
Evolutionary speculations aside, the claim that the four networks of collec-
tive power already provide the basis for the exercise of distributive power in 
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hunting and gathering societies is supported by the fact that even in these 
small-scale societies the men often use them to exclude or subjugate women. 
The secretive men’s huts in which religion is practiced often exclude women 
on pain of gang rape or death, and men will band together to kill women who 
resist changes in the social order (Gregor 1985; Sanday 1981). Although 
women’s power can vary from non-existent to significant within the economic 
network in varying societies at different times in history, they have had little or 
no power in the other three networks in most societies until the last 200 years 
in Western Europe and North America, and what economic power they had 
was usually “discounted,” or rendered far less important, by machinations 
within the political network (Blumberg 1984). It is therefore safe to conclude 
that male dominance is the first and most pervasive form of a power structure 
in human history. The importance of the four networks in understanding the 
subjugation of women is also seen in Mann’s (1986a) work on women’s gradu-
ally increasing power since the sixteenth century in Europe, which demon-
strates that changes in the four networks since that time help to explain why 
and how women have been able to challenge patriarchy to an increasing de-
gree.  
Generally speaking, however, these nascent and temporary forms of power 
organization do not become the basis for distributive power in hunting and 
gathering or tribal-level societies, even though some of the leaders in some of 
these activities, who are more or less selected or agreed to by the group, try to 
take advantage of their positions. Anthropologist Christopher Boehm (1999, 
83), who has carried out a detailed analysis of hundreds of the ethnographies 
compiled by anthropologists over the past 150 years, makes this point through 
the example of a shaman who said he probably could stop a violent snowstorm 
that was causing great concern, but that he “needed to have sexual intercourse 
with two girls” in order to do so. The father of one girl agreed to it, but the 
husband of the second refused permission and the snowstorm continued. How-
ever, any attempts by would-be dominators (leaders in the hunt, religious spe-
cialists, military warriors, and trusted mediators and adjudicators) to take ad-
vantage of their positions are usually not successful, at least not for very long. 
Collective power is still ascendant because the “rank-and-file” members of 
those societies are able to be surprisingly and subtly vigilant against those who 
attempt to take advantage of their positions. They are controlled through gos-
sip, chastisement, shunning, and if necessary, assassination. Contrary to the 
image of these societies as lacking a power structure, an image that is embod-
ied in the Christian idea of the Garden of Eden and the Marxist idea of primi-
tive communism, it seems more likely, based on Boehm’s (1999) comparative 
studies of ethnographic accounts, that these small-scale societies have an “in-
verted power structure” in which people are able to maintain an egalitarian (but 
in most ways male-dominated) social structure through the kinds of collective 
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actions against potential dominators that range from criticism to ostracism to 
murder.  
With a few exceptions, this egalitarianism continues with the development 
of tribal societies (those that have domesticated plants and animals), which 
often have thousands of members, not just the several hundred for hunting and 
gathering groups (Boehm 1999, 90). The members of the tribe remain vigilant 
against potential tyrants, but they often allow for informal leaders, whose big-
gest role is in settling disputes, which from my angle signals a rise in the im-
portance of the political network due to an increase in likely personal and fa-
milial disputes in a larger group. What is striking, however, is that these 
“chiefs” are self-effacing and are praised for their kindness, generosity, and 
even temperaments (Boehm 1999, 33). This lack of a fixed hierarchy remains 
true even for those tribes that enter into warfare with nearby tribes, or for con-
federations of tribes that join together to fight rival confederations (Boehm 
1999, 94-94). 
As with the hunting and gathering societies, the tribal societies have ways to 
maintain their egalitarianism. For example, members who go out to earn money 
in nearby hierarchical societies, or who make money as traders and merchants 
in dealings with other societies, and thereby become “big men,” have to give 
away a considerable portion of their earnings as gifts, or enter into gambling 
games in which money is likely to be redistributed through the workings of 
chance. At the same time, criticism, ostracism, and assassination are still used 
if necessary (Boehm 1999, 110-122). 
Nevertheless, the very fact that informal leaders, chiefs, and big men may 
try to take advantage of their positions is probably indicative of the tendency 
within human beings that is captured by the famous idea that power tends to 
corrupt, with absolute power corrupting absolutely. That is, people enjoy being 
in charge and bossing other people around, often for their own pleasure and 
advantage. This possibility receives support in psychology experiments with 
college students in which the power of the randomly chosen members of a 
small group is subtly manipulated by the experimenters. In these situations, the 
perceptions and actions of those who have been given more power begin to 
change very quickly. They soon fail to understand how less powerful people 
perceive and feel about the situation, are more likely to condemn cheating 
while cheating more often themselves, and come to believe they have more 
control over events than they in fact do (e.g. Fast, Gruenfeld, Sivanathan and 
Galinsky 2009; Galinsky et al. 2006; Lammers, Stapel and Galinsky 2010). 
They also tend to distance themselves from others, to think more abstractly, 
and to objectify others as instruments for personal gain, whereas those who 
lack power in experimental situations become more deferential, inhibit the 
expression of their actual attitudes, and suffer from impairments in their think-
ing abilities even though they were as capable as other participants before the 
studies began (Keltner, Gruenfeld, Galinsky, and Kraus 2010; Smith 2006; 
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Smith, Jostmann, Galinsky, and Dijk 2008). I think these studies tell us how 
attitudes of superiority and inferiority can develop and then be exploited, even 
though they arise from seemingly small and benign starting points.  
Put in a theoretically more confrontational way, these studies show us that 
the social psychology that shapes those who have leadership positions is most 
likely the primary issue in understanding how organizations based in coopera-
tive efforts to achieve shared purposes become power structures. We do not 
have to start with the hypothesis that the dominators are alpha males, power-
hungry personalities, or psychopathic personalities in order to understand how 
an egalitarian (albeit cantankerous and combative) branch of the homo genus 
came to live in hierarchies controlled by corruptible, and often deeply self-
serving, dominators. There are many such negative personality types, and they 
may rise to the top in some cases, assuming they can control the anti-social 
tendencies that are usually part of their personal make-up, but studies of infor-
mal leadership in groups ranging from children to young adults suggest that 
those who initially emerge as leaders are people who like to engage socially 
with others – that is, they are people who score high on extraversion on person-
ality scales (Keltner, Van Kleef, Chen, and Kraus 2008). It’s at that point that 
social psychology takes over and leaders tend to lose perspective and become 
self-important.  
But another factor has to be added as well. Once there are permanent hierar-
chical organizations, it may be that all the negative effects of being powerful – 
or powerless – are magnified. 
The Origins of Hierarchical Societies  
Although potential dominators could be thwarted in the small-scale societies 
that characterized the first 95 percent of cognitively modern homo sapiens’ 
100,000-year history, this was no longer the case when societies become larger 
and more complex. When the level of organization reaches a large enough 
scale over a long enough period of time, a permanent division of labour devel-
ops that can further increase an organization’s collective power due to a spe-
cialization of function at all of its levels. Since this division of labour makes 
sense in terms of collective power, it clearly increases the ability of a society to 
grow larger and to defend itself when necessary. But, and here is the starting 
point for distributive power and elite theory, the division of labour also con-
tains the potential for a sustained hierarchical distribution of power because 
“those who occupy supervisory and coordinating positions have an immense 
organizational superiority over the others” (Mann 1986b, 6-7).  
In other words, even though the members sometimes choose the leaders of 
nascent organizations because they seem to be natural leaders, these leaders 
often turn into dominators for the social-psychological reasons discussed in the 
previous section. As many theorists of varying persuasions have noted, includ-
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ing Higley and Burton (2006, 5), this transformation is possible because those 
at the top can turn the organization into their own power base due to the infor-
mation and material resources they control, their ability to reshape the structure 
of the organization, their power to hire and fire underlings, and their opportuni-
ties to make alliances with other organizational leaders. Using the bland lan-
guage of organizational sociology to talk about a charged issue, the assembled 
leaders create “interorganizational” alliances that generate a power structure in 
which the leaders (“the political elite” for elite theorists, “the power elite” for 
Mills) use their combined organizational resources to develop barriers that 
make it more and more difficult for people outside or on the bottom of these 
organizations to participate in the governance of the society in general, while at 
the same time entering into the constant rivalries that are noted by elite theory 
(Burton and Higley 1987). 
Moreover, the people who lack power suffer more than the inability to par-
ticipate. As suggested in the discussion of experiments on the effects of power 
differences in small groups, the powerless are more likely to think more nar-
rowly and suffer from small defects in their thinking than those who are made 
to feel powerful, an outcome that in the real world has been used by dominators 
the world over as proof that those who are subjugated are intellectually inferior. 
The self-serving rationale that “we are better than they are, and that’s why we 
are powerful,” is still with us today, of course, in the minds of many whites, 
neoconservative intellectuals, those who have been able to use their socioeco-
nomic advantages to gain advanced degrees, and those politicians who have 
used their charm and verbal skills to gain the confidence of large campaign 
donors. 
In addition, those who are dominated are affected by the chronic stress that 
follows from a lack of power and causes a wide range of negative conse-
quences. Most specifically, there are numerous epidemiological investigations 
showing that people on the lower rungs of the social ladder die younger and 
develop more physical and mental illnesses, even in the case of those who 
make a comfortable living and are not materially deprived in any way (e.g. 
Adler et al. 2008). The fact that the issue is first and foremost a lack of power, 
not material deprivations, can be seen most clearly in an ongoing longitudinal 
study of well-educated and financially secure British civil servants, where there 
is even a difference on mortality and health factors between those in charge and 
those just below them. As one summary of the findings in that study puts it, 
“Most striking was the significant difference in mortality between high-level 
civil servants who were well-paid professionals and those one level above them 
at the very top” (Adler 2009, 664).  
The old German saying that “life is like a chicken coop ladder,” used as the 
title of a book on culture by folklorist Alan Dundes (1984), goes too far as a 
general characterization of human society because of the many opportunities 
for cooperation, love, and autonomy that exist at the various levels of the peck-
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ing order. It also ignores those moments when there is a more collective sense 
of “we-ness” that transcends class and hierarchy, such as during patriotic holi-
days, festivals, and religious observances. However, the graphic imagery of 
one’s standing on a chicken-coop ladder reminds us of the fact that power 
structures have adverse effects, often fatal, which go far beyond issues of mate-
rial needs because of the many negative effects of the chronic stress that is 
generated by a lack of power. 
Once the leaders of ongoing large-scale organizations are further organized 
into a general power structure, which may take many centuries to fully develop, 
as the archaeological record shows, ordinary members of the society are or-
ganizationally outflanked, no longer able to maintain the more informal in-
verted power structures that kept pre-civilized societies largely egalitarian 
(Boehm 1999). People become trapped in the form of society called “civiliza-
tion.” However, as Boehm (1999, 145) also notes, the new dominators still 
have “significant conflict-resolution duties,” which to me suggests that the 
political network is usually at the centre of a society’s power structure, even 
though its leader or leaders draw upon the power they have gained through 
dominating the other organizational networks. One thing is certain: the egalitar-
ian ethos has been replaced. Hierarchy becomes “the way things are,” even if 
many people resent it and others organize themselves to try to win control of 
top positions from the current rulers.  
Western History in Four Paragraphs 
However, it goes too far to say that states are inevitably at the centre of power 
networks, as seen in the case of early European history after the fall of the 
Roman Empire, the largest empire of domination from ancient times. The insti-
tution of private property developed in the context of a system of numerous 
small, weak states that struggled along in the territory previously dominated by 
the militarized Roman state. This economic development was made possible by 
the “normative pacification” provided by the Catholic Church and by the pre-
dominance of military techniques that rendered armoured knights on horseback 
ascendant over serfs and peasants (Mann 1986b, 376-8, 390-1). Due to this turn 
of events, feudal lords did not need states to protect their private property and 
increase the exploitation of the peasantry. Moreover, the weakness of the many 
small states allowed the system of private property to take deeper root without 
the danger of state appropriation, and for an independent merchant class to 
develop. The result was a growing independence for the economic network in 
general: “By the time trade was really buoyant (1150 to 1250 A.D.),” claims 
Mann (1986b, 397), “it was accompanied by merchant and artisan institutions 
with an autonomy unparalleled in other civilizations.” 
This weak-state power configuration began to change in the 12th and 13th 
centuries. As markets grew, there was more and more need for state regulation, 
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and as merchants increased the scope of their trade into bigger and bigger terri-
tories, they needed more protection against bandits and the petty rulers of small 
territories (Mann 1986b, 423-4, 431-2). Richer merchants accumulated assets 
that made them worthwhile allies for political elites. The combination of coer-
cion and capital overwhelmed the localized strengths of feudal nobles and 
clerics (Tilly 1990). Merchants also developed an interest in aggressive wars 
that would widen the territory in which they could operate: “From now on 
commercial motivations, the conquest of markets as well as land, were to play 
a part in wars” (Mann 1986b, 432). Merchants thus quietly encouraged the 
growth of the state, lending it the money necessary to raise a larger army. New 
developments in the military network also triggered changes in the relationship 
between private property and the state. The sudden emergence of the disci-
plined military phalanx, that is, spear-armed infantry in close formation, 
quickly led to the defeat of nobles on horseback in a series of battles between 
1302 and 1315, so the nobility had to turn increasingly to the state to raise a 
standing army of full-time foot soldiers to protect its land (Mann 1986b, 18-9, 
428). There soon followed a series of technological innovations that added up 
to a military revolution, so the arms race among states was on. Only states with 
large armies could survive, and only states that could gain the loyalty of lords 
and merchants could afford large armies. 
From the 16th century onward, the first genuinely powerful states in history 
began to play a larger and larger role, as Lachmann (2010) shows in his crea-
tive synthesis and extension of our knowledge of states and power. States de-
veloped a very real potential for autonomy, but also the potential to be of 
greater use to economic elites. Capitalism and the nation-state gradually grew 
powerful together because they needed and aided each other. As the alliance 
between these two power networks solidified, they subordinated the previously 
independent religious and military realms. States now began to fit the usual 
sociological definition: the organization that controls the military and police 
within a given geographical area. And when a state extended its regulatory 
powers over a new territory, so too did capitalism diffuse more fully into that 
territory. Contrary to the oft-expressed view that classes and states are antago-
nistic, they became closely intertwined in Western history. 
The class system generated by capitalism was segmented into a small num-
ber of “class-nations” of roughly equal power that together formed a multi-state 
system, and from the outset there was constant tension between economic elites 
and political elites. Feudal lords wanted protection for their lands, and mer-
chants wanted protection and regulation for their goods and markets, but both 
feared the taxing power of the state elites (Mann 1986b, 433). Conversely, state 
elites tried to gain as much autonomy as they could. Much of Western history 
from this time forward is about the lethal bickering between economic and 
political elites, with an occasional time-out to deal with peasants or artisans or 
workers who tried to take advantage of the divisions in elite circles.  
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Hooray for John (and Michael) 
Which brings us to modern-day elite theory, with applause for John Higley, and 
for his equally perceptive co-author, Michael Burton, for their theoretical and 
empirical contributions, as well as for creating a welcoming scholarly envi-
ronment for all theorists interested in a problematic and potentially terrifying 
relationship that can make life miserable, painful and short for billions of peo-
ple, a relationship that is bloodlessly called “distributional power” in the social 
sciences. They have sorted through the variety of claims and contentions made 
by elite theorists of the past, refurbishing some and discarding others, to fash-
ion a viable theory that roots their work in large-scale organizations and the 
power advantages such organizations confer on their top leaders. They show 
that the inevitability of elites is not incompatible with social-democratic out-
comes and reject Robert Michel’s “dim view of rank-and-file interests and 
capacities” (Higley and Burton 2006, 6). 
In addition, they have dug deeply into and synthesized a vast range of spe-
cialized historical studies to make an original and plausible argument: The 
relatively few occasions on which democracies have arisen and survived in-
volve one or more of three factors, all of which have relevance in understand-
ing the United States. First, the consensually oriented elites necessary for de-
mocracy often develop in the context of a colonial society, which gives these 
elites long experience at self-rule, and then sometimes a common enemy to 
unite them further, which fits the United States case, as they demonstrate in 
their discussion of American history through the early 1780s (Higley and Bur-
ton 2006, 109-12).  
Second, democracies also sometimes arise in the context of relatively sud-
den elite pacts or “settlements,” usually after years of debilitating and fruitless 
violent confrontations, or in the face of extreme economic crisis. Although the 
United States already had a relatively consensual elite due to its colonial ori-
gins and war of independence, its Constitution has many elements of an elite 
pact in that it compromised several issues that rival colonial leaders said were 
not negotiable, while at the same time making it possible to deal with danger-
ous rival nations and possible non-elite challengers inside the country (Shay’s 
Rebellion being the case in point). Most important, Northern wealth holders 
had to make several concessions to the Southern slave owners to win their 
agreement to the new constitution. Even in this example, the difficulties of 
establishing a firm elite consensus, which are emphasized by Higley and Bur-
ton (2006, 64-8) in their masterful discussion of the perilous steps to an elite 
settlement, are tragically demonstrated by the fact that the Southern slavehold-
ers decided to secede from the union and risk the devastating Civil War that 
soon followed rather than see their way of life gradually eroded by an inability 
to expand slavery westward. 
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Finally, democracies sometimes develop when there are “convergences” to-
ward elite consensus and shared political norms in a context in which rival 
elites have to compete “for support amid economically prosperous electorates 
that are averse to drastic alterations in the status quo” (Higley and Burton 2006, 
4). The United States is not a prime example here, but it seems to me that the 
country’s booming economic potential once the Civil War ended did play a role 
in establishing a less public (and basically informal) elite pact between North-
ern and Southern elites, the Compromise of 1877, as Higley and Burton (2006, 
114) rightly note by ending their informative discussion of the American case 
with the Northern acceptance of the plantation capitalists’ re-subjugation and 
extreme exploitation of their African American workforce. 
I began this thank-you to John Higley for his friendship, and for all I have 
learned from him over the decades, by saying that I work within a parallel, but 
slightly different research tradition. So I am pleased to end my appreciation of 
him and his fine work by saying that the power structure research tradition 
seems to be in broad agreement with elite theory when it comes to the Ameri-
can case, albeit with the power structure research tradition putting more em-
phasis on corporate elites and class conflict. Whatever the differences that 
remain, I think Elite Foundations of Liberal Democracy is a signal triumph, an 
original contribution to the social sciences, and a strong challenge to the tradi-
tional theories of democracy that it engages. 
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